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Abstract
In 2011, Gu-Xue proposed an improved secret handshakes scheme with unlinkability based on
the Huang-Cao scheme that can achieve strong unlinkability against an outsider adversary. How-
ever, this paper points out that Gu-Xue scheme is insecure to key-compromise impersonation
(K-CI) attack and cannot provide master key forward secrecy (MFS).
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1. Introduction
Unlinkable secret handshakes scheme provides unlinkability which means that an adversary
cannot link any two diﬀerent instances of same party ([1]). Therefore, unlinkability property
has been recognized as a desirable security requirement in many applications such as group
signatures, identity escrow, electronic-cash and unlinkable credentials. In 2007, Jarecki et al.
([2]) ﬁrst proposed an unlinkable secret handshakes scheme. In 2009, Huang and Cao ([3])
proposed a novel and eﬃcient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme that requires only constant
exponentiations instead of the logarithm complexity. However, both Su ([4]) and Youn et al.
([5]) examined the security of the Huang-Cao scheme and then proved some security ﬂaws of
the scheme. Su ([4]) demonstrated that an adversary who did not register himself as a group user
can successfully make a unlinkable secret handshaking with other registered users. Youn et al.
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-53-850-7291; Fax: +82-53-850-7609.
Email address: ejyoon@kiu.ac.kr (Eun-Jun Yoon)
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of ICAE 2011
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
129 Eun-Jun Yoon /  Procedia Engineering  24 ( 2011 )  128 – 132 
([5]) showed that it fails to achieve two fundamental requirements such as the aﬃliation-hiding
property and the authenticated key exchange (AKE) security.
In 2011, Gu-Xue ([6]) proposed an improved secret handshakes scheme with unlinkability
based the on Huang-Cao scheme to overcome Youn et al.’s proposed attacks. Gu-Xue scheme is
ID-based AKE scheme. Although, Gu-Xue scheme achieved strong unlinkability against an out-
sider adversaryA, the scheme cannot provide Key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) resilience
and does not provide master key forward secrecy (MFS). K-CI resilience and MFS are important
security requirements in ID-based two-party AKE scheme ([7, 8, 9, 10, 11]). They deﬁne as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) resilience - Suppose legitimate entity UA’s
private key is compromised. It is obvious that an adversary who knows this key to impersonate
UA to any other entity (e.g. UB). However, compromising UA’s private key should not enable the
adversary to impersonate any other entity (e.g. UB) to UA.
Deﬁnition 2. Forward secrecy (FS) - Long-term private keys’s disclosure of one or more of the
entities should not aﬀect the secrecy of previous session keys established by honest entities. It
can be considered as three cases from diﬀerent levels of this property:
1. Partial forward secrecy: Compromising some but not all of the entities long-term keys can
not disclose previously established session keys.
2. Perfect forward secrecy (PFS): Compromising all of the entities long-term keys can not
disclose previously established session keys.
3. Master key forward secrecy (MFS): Compromising the master private key of the group
administrator (GA) cannot aﬀect the secrecy of previously established session keys. This
is a particular property in the identity-based systems and it implies perfect forward secrecy.
Therefore, this paper points out that Gu-Xue scheme is insecure to K-CI attack and cannot
provide MFS based on the above deﬁnitions. Our cryptanalysis results are important for security
engineers, who are responsible for the design and development of eﬃcient and secure secret
handshakes schemes with unlinkability.
2. Review of Gu-Xue scheme
This section brieﬂy reviews the Gu-Xue scheme ([6]). The scheme is composed of three
algorithms: CreateGroup, AdmitMember, and Handshakes. The following system parameters
are used throughout this paper.
• k: Security parameter.
• G1, G2: Two cyclic groups of a large prime order q.
• P,Q ∈ G1: Two generators of group G1.
• eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2: Bilinear pairing map if for any a, b ∈ Zq, P,Q ∈ G1, where eˆ(aP, bQ) =
eˆ(P,Q)ab.
• G∗1: Non-identity elements set of G1.
• H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k: Two cryptographic hash functions.
The system params = {q,G1,G2,G∗1, eˆ, k, P,Q, H0,H1} are published.
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2.1. CreateGroup
A group administrator GA creates a group G by selecting a random number s ∈ Zq as the
secret speciﬁc to G. G is deﬁned by the set of users belonging to G.
2.2. AdmitMember
To admit user Ui into group G, GA chooses a random string idi ← {0, 1}k and computes a
long-term private key S i = sQi where Qi = H(idi), and issues certi = (idi, S i) to user Ui through
anonymous and secure channel.
2.3. Handshakes
The interactions between two participants UA, UB who belong to two groups denoted by G0
and G1 respectively, are shown in Fig. 1. Each user’s input is a couple (cert, init/resp) where
cert is a certiﬁcate and init/resp is the user’s role in the scheme. Let agree−on be a special
symbol, diﬀerent from init and resp.
Shared Information: params={q,G1,G2,G∗1, eˆ, k, P,Q,H0,H1}
UA on inputs of UB on inputs of
(certA = (idA, S A), init) (certB = (idB, S B), resp)
x ∈ Zq
QA = H(idA)
EA = xQA
EA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
y ∈ Zq
QB = H(idB)
EB = yQB
KB = eˆ(EA, yS B) = eˆ(QA,QB)sxy
VB = H1(KB, EB, resp)
EB,VB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
KA = eˆ(xS A, EB) = eˆ(QA,QB)sxy
Verify VB
?
=H1(KA, EB, resp)
VA = H1(KA, EA, init)
skA = H1(KA, EA, EB, agree−on)
VA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify VA
?
=H1(KB, EA, init)
skB = H1(KB, EA, EB, agree−on)
Figure 1: Gu-Xue’s unlinkable secret handshakes scheme
3. Cryptanalysis of Gu-Xue’s scheme
This section shows that Gu-Xue scheme is insecure to K-CI attack and does not provide MFS.
3.1. Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) Attack
Gu-Xue scheme cannot withstand K-CI attack. Assume that the long-term private key certA =
(idA, S A) of UA is disclosed to the adversaryA, which will then impersonate as UB (it means any
registered users of group G) to UA. In the proposed K-CI attack, A can compute valid E′B and
V ′B and then send them to UA. Since the transmitted messages between the two participating
parties contain the secret shared key KA = K′B; therefore, A can prepare a suitable message to
impersonate the initiator party to any part of the network model as in the Gu-Xue’s scheme:
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1. UA generates a random integer x ∈ Zq, computes QA = H(idA) and EA = xQA, and then
sends EA toA.
2. Upon receiving EA from UA, an adversaryA computes QB, E′B, K′B and V ′B as follows:
QB = H(idA) (1)
E′B = QA (2)
K′B = eˆ(S A, EA) = eˆ(QA,QA)
sx (3)
V ′B = H1(K
′
B, E
′
B, resp) (4)
Finally,A sends E′B and V ′B to UA.
3. Upon receiving E′B and V
′
B from A, UA will compute same secret shared key KA =
eˆ(xS A, E′B) = eˆ(QA,QA)
sx. UA will verify whether V ′B
?
=H1(KA, E′B, resp). Because they
always hold, UA will compute a message authentication value VA = H1(KA, EA, init) and
common session key skA = H1(KA, EA, EB, agree−on). Finally, UA will send VA toA.
4. Upon receiving VA from UA,A computes common session key sk′B as follows:
sk′B = H1(K
′
B, EA, E
′
B, agree−on) (5)
BecauseA is a dishonest party, it does not need to check the message authentication value
VA as the honest party; therefore, it accepts the computed value sk′B as the session key.
Clearly, an adversary A can impersonate UA to other parties in the group G using the long-
term private key certA = (idA, S A) of UA; therefore, the Gu-Xue’s scheme cannot withstand the
K-CI attack as shown in Fig. 2.
Shared Information: params={q,G1,G2,G∗1, eˆ, k, P,Q,H0,H1}
UA on inputs of A on inputs of
(certA = (idA, S A), init) (certA = (idA, S A), resp)
x ∈ Zq
QA = H(idA)
EA = xQA
EA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
QA = H(idA)
E′B = QA
K′B = eˆ(S A, EA) = eˆ(QA,QA)
sx
V′B = H1(K
′
B, E
′
B, resp)
E′B,V
′
B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
KA = eˆ(xS A, E′B) = eˆ(QA,QA)
sx
Verify V′B
?
=H1(KA, E′B, resp)
VA = H1(KA, EA, init)
skA = H1(KA, EA, EB, agree−on)
VA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
It is not necessary to check UA’s vector
becauseA is a dishonest party
sk′B = H1(K
′
B, EA, E
′
B, agree−on)
Figure 2: K-CI attack on Gu-Xue scheme.
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3.2. Master Key Forward Secrecy (MFS) Problem
Gu-Xue scheme cannot provide MFS ([7, 8]). MFS is important security requirement in ID-
based AKE scheme. That is, if the group administrator GA’s secret key s is compromised, this
should not compromise the previously established session keys sk. In the Gu-Xue scheme, if
the long-term private keys S A of UA and S B of UB are compromised, the secrecy of previously
established session keys sk = H1(K, EA, EB, agree−on) should not be aﬀected without knowing x
and y, where K = KA = KB = eˆ(QA,QB)sxy. Therefore, Gu-Xue scheme provides perfect forward
secrecy (PFS).
However, an adversary A which is not a registered group user can successfully make a un-
linkable secret handshaking with other registered users. That is,A can simply compute the secret
shared key K between UA and UB by using the group secret s of GA as follows:
K = eˆ(EA, EB)s = eˆ(QA,QB)sxy (6)
where EA and EB are random numbers chosen by UA and UB, respectively. In addition, A can
compute the common session key sk = H1(K, EA, EB, agree− on) by using the computed K
and then freely impersonate UA or UB in the subsequent communications between UA and UB.
Therefore,A can make a valid unlinkable secret handshaking with other registered user because
of MFS problem in Gu-Xue scheme.
4. Conclusions
This paper pointed out that the Gu-Xue’s eﬃcient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme can-
not withstand key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attack and does not provide master key
forward secrecy (MFS). For this reason, Gu-Xue scheme is insecure for practical application. It
is important that security engineers should be made aware of this, if they are responsible for the
design and development of secure unlinkable secret handshakes schemes.
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